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Advice taking has been robustly researched in many different areas. The previous literature 
shows multiple factors can affect the likelihood of someone taking advice. For example, 
people are typically more likely to follow advice when the advice is expressed confidently 
rather than in an unsure manner (Gaertig & Simmons, 2018). Additionally, when people 
report a higher liking of the advice giver, they are more likely to follow the advice (Bo Feng 
& MacGeorge, 2010). Given what is known about the influence of confidence and likeability 
on advice taking, the current study combined these factors to examine whether the influence 
of confidence depends on how much one likes the advisor. Advisor likeability was 
manipulated by having the participant read a passage they believed an advisor wrote 
depicting the advisor as either likeable or unlikeable. Next, participants received advice 
expressed confidently or in an unsure manner from this advisor regarding a number of trivia 




take the advice expressed confidently as compared to in an unsure manner. The advisors’ 
likeability did not significantly impact levels of advice taking, and contrary to my primary 
prediction, the influence of confidence was similar regardless of whether the advisor was 







 First, I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Andrew Smith, for not only my academic growth, 
but also for my growth as an individual over the last 6 years. Dr. Smith has served as an outstanding 
role model. His continuous encouragement, support, and passion for his students and job has taught 
me ways to persevere and grow. I have always had issues with being confident in my abilities to 
succeed, and Dr. Smith, as well as Dr. Twila Wingrove, taught me of the dangers of negative self-
talk, believed in me when I did not believe in myself, and most importantly, fostered the level of 
confidence that I now have in the work I have done and will continue to do. Furthermore, I want to 
thank Dr. Doris Bazzini and Dr. Andrew Monroe for serving on the committee for this thesis and for 
always providing productive and necessary feedback throughout this project. I would also like to 
thank Lucinda O. Payne for the inspiration she instilled in me sophomore year of my undergraduate 
career. The passion she has for her job and students immediately sparked my interest in collegiate 
level teaching. I will forever be thankful for her encouragement, support, and smiles throughout the 
last 5 years. Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends for being encouraging and 
supportive. Without you all, my success in graduate school and on this project would have been much 








I dedicate this thesis to my family, the Appalachian State University’s 2018 Experimental Psychology 







Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ iv 
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... vi 
Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................................. ix 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
Method ............................................................................................................................................ 12 
Results ............................................................................................................................................ 15 
Discussion ....................................................................................................................................... 20 
References ...................................................................................................................................... 27 
Appendix A: IRB Exemption Email ............................................................................................... 36 
Appendix B: Consent to Participate in Research ........................................................................... 38 
Appendix C: Likeability Manipulation .......................................................................................... 39 
Appendix D: Trivia Questions ........................................................................................................ 40 
Appendix E: Confident and Unsure Advice ................................................................................... 41 
Appendix F: Advisor Perception Questions ................................................................................... 42 
 




List of Figures 
 
Figure 1. Participants’ ratings of their advisor’s confidence on a 7-point scale for the in-lab 
and online samples. ...................................................................................................................... 32 
Figure 2. Participants’ ratings of their advisor’s likeability on a 7-point scale for the in-lab and 
online samples. ............................................................................................................................. 33 
Figure 3. Participants’ average WOA scores, split by confidence and likeability conditions. 
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 34 
Figure 4. Participants’ average WOA scores for the in-lab and online samples, split by 
confidence and likeability conditions. ....................................................................................... 35 
 








Confident Bastards:  
The Influence of Advisor Confidence and Likeability on Advice Taking 
Victor L. Norris III 
Appalachian State University 
  





Advice taking has been robustly researched in many different areas. The previous literature 
shows multiple factors can affect the likelihood of someone taking advice. For example, 
people are typically more likely to follow advice when the advice is expressed confidently 
rather than in an unsure manner (Gaertig & Simmons, 2018). Additionally, when people 
report a higher liking of the advice giver, they are more likely to follow the advice (Bo Feng 
& MacGeorge, 2010). Given what is known about the influence of confidence and likeability 
on advice taking, the current study combined these factors to examine whether the influence 
of confidence depends on how much one likes the advisor. Advisor likeability was 
manipulated by having the participant read a passage they believed an advisor wrote 
depicting the advisor as either likeable or unlikeable. Next, participants received advice 
expressed confidently or in an unsure manner from this advisor regarding a number of trivia 
questions. Lastly, participants answered the trivia questions. Participants were more likely to 
take the advice expressed confidently as compared to in an unsure manner. The advisors’ 
likeability did not significantly impact levels of advice taking, and contrary to my primary 
prediction, the influence of confidence was similar regardless of whether the advisor was 








Confident Bastards:  
The Influence of Advisor Confidence and Likeability on Advice Taking 
People are faced with many decisions and judgments every day. People often make 
these decisions on their own, perhaps because they feel confident in their decision or because 
the decision is not particularly important. However, there are many situations in which they 
may seek out and use advice given from other people. This study examined factors that affect 
whether people use advice to make their decision. Specifically, I examined the influence of 
advisor confidence and likeability on advice taking. 
Why Take Advice? 
Before describing factors that influence advice taking, it is important to understand 
why people might take advice at all. Harvey and Fischer (1997) outlined three primary 
reasons: to receive help, to improve judgments, and to share responsibility for potential 
outcomes. Consider a situation in which George is completely indecisive. In this case, 
George may take advice to help him overcome his indecisiveness and make a decision.  
Regardless of whether the advice led to a good decision, the advice at least helped George 
make a decision. In other cases, George may have some knowledge, but might heed advice in 
order to improve his judgments decisions (e.g., he knows his car is worth more than $5,000, 
but does not know exactly how much more he should ask when selling it). Lastly, when 
decisions are of great importance, George may take advice from outside sources, regardless 
of his expertise, in an attempt to disperse responsibility for the possible consequences. 
Although the reasons for taking advice appear to be relatively straightforward, there are 
multiple factors that can influence whether or not one takes advice from others.  
Factors That Influence Advice Taking 




Research examining the factors that predict whether people actually take others’ 
advice include features of the person receiving advice (e.g., pre-existing knowledge, personal 
opinions, and current emotions), features of the person giving the advice (e.g. level of 
expertise, confidence, knowledge, and likeability), and situational features surrounding the 
decision being made (e.g., level of urgency and importance). With regard to the impact of 
decision-makers’ features on advice taking, Yaniv (2004) found that having less pre-existing 
knowledge led to greater taking of advice. Contrastingly, subjects’ current emotions—for 
example feeling positively about themselves and negatively of others—make people less 
likely to take advice compared to people who are primed to feel negatively about themselves 
and positively of others (de Hooge, Verlegh, & Tzioti, 2014). 
Many decisions people make throughout each day result in miniscule consequences. 
For example, deciding which shirt to wear while lounging around the house most likely has 
very little meaning; however, deciding which shirt to wear for a first date may come with 
greater importance. Research examining the situational factors influencing advice taking 
found that more important decisions (e.g., when money was on the line) compared to when 
advice comes at no cost (Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004). Similarly, Gino (2008) 
demonstrated that people are more likely to take advice when they pay for it (e.g., paying for 
advice from a therapist or financial advisor) compared to when it’s free. In her study, Gino 
(2008) had participants answer questions regarding United States history and provided them 
with the opportunity to receive either free or paid advice. In either case, participants received 
identical advice, and participants received no information about the advisor (e.g., their level 
of expertise). Results showed that paid advice led to significantly higher advice taking than 
did free advice. 




Although the importance of a decision (e.g., potential financial incentives) influences 
advice taking, the general consequences (positive or negative) of the decision also seem to 
influence the likelihood of one taking advice. In one study examining this situational factor, 
Harvey and Fischer (1997) told participants in the high-criticality condition that the decision 
being made was extremely important because it could prevent a company bankruptcy, while 
those in the low-criticality condition were told the decision was just a part of everyday 
business. When the decision had a potentially large impact people were more likely to follow 
others’ advice compared to when the decisions were mundane.  
Regardless of the importance, there are times when people must make decisions 
quickly; the amount of time allowed to make a judgment or decision can also impact whether 
or not one takes advice. Johnson and Johnson (2017) examined the impact of time pressure 
on advice taking by having participants recommend a business decision while acting as the 
Vice President of the company. Some participants were told that the decision must be made 
within an hour, while the other participants were told they had a comfortable amount of time 
to make the decision. Those that had little time to make their judgment took advice less than 
those with no time pressure (Johnson & Johnson, 2017). It seems that people may be 
reluctant to take advice when there are lessened opportunities to evaluate the quality of 
advice and the credibility of the advisor. 
As noted earlier, in addition to the characteristics of the decision maker and the 
situation, there are many features of the person giving advice that contributes to whether or 
not their advice is followed. When someone does not know what to do in a given situation 
and they perceive the person giving them advice as an expert in that area, not surprisingly, 
they are more likely to take that advice (Bo Feng & MacGeorge, 2010; Bonaccio & Dalal, 




2006; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Rakoczy, Ehrling, Harris, & Schultze, 2015; Sniezek & Van 
Swol, 2001).  
Whereas there are several factors that influence the likelihood of advice taking, most 
relevant to the proposed study are two specific advisor characteristics: confidence and 
likability. The way in which an advisor presents information, particularly with or without 
expressed confidence, has been shown to impact whether or not one takes advice (Gaertig & 
Simmons, 2018). Furthermore, whether or not one takes advice can also depend on how 
much he or she likes the advisor (Bo Feng & MacGeorge, 2010). The current study 
investigated the potential interaction between confidence and likeability by combining the 
two factors and examining their combined influence on advice taking. 
Advisor Confidence 
There have been a number of studies examining the influence of advisor confidence 
on advice taking. These studies demonstrate that people are more likely to follow advice 
when delivered by someone expressing confidence (e.g., Bang et al., 2004; Gaertig & 
Simmons, 2018; Price & Stone, 2004; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). In one study, Price and 
Stone (2004) presented participants with two fictional financial advisors’ advice regarding 
potential stock increases. One advisor was moderately confident in their predictions whereas 
the other advisor was very confident in their predictions. After evaluating the advisors’ 
investing advice, participants were asked to indicate which of the two financial advisors they 
would prefer to hire. Across experiments, people typically preferred the very confident 
advisor as opposed to the more moderate advisor. This suggests that people use advisor 
confidence, at least in part, as a cue in choosing the most effective source of advice. 




Recent research extended these findings by manipulating aspects of advice and 
examining whether or not advisor confidence overrules these aspects. For example, Gaertig 
and Simmons (2018) had participants predict the outcomes of Major League Baseball games. 
The researchers manipulated two related, but distinct aspects of the advice: certainty and 
confidence. Specifically, before making a prediction, participants were presented with either 
certain or uncertain advice (e.g., 100% vs. 57% chance of Chicago Cubs winning the game) 
delivered by either a confident or an unsure advisor. Although confidence and certainty are 
related, it is possible to be confident in uncertain advice (e.g., a meteorologist being 100% 
confident of a 50% chance of rain). This implies a level of uncertainty because of the chance 
of rain while still presenting confidence. Participants in the certain condition were presented 
with advice expressing complete certainty (e.g., “The Chicago Cubs will win this game.”) 
whereas participants in the uncertain condition were presented with advice expressing 
uncertainty about the outcome (e.g., “There is about a 57% chance that the Chicago Cubs 
will win this game.”). Confidence was manipulated by preceding the advice with either an 
unsure disclaimer (e.g., “I am not sure, but I think that the Chicago Cubs will win the 
game.”) or a confident statement (e.g., “I am very confident that the Chicago Cubs will win 
the game.”). The researchers found that the certainty in the outcome did not influence 
participants’ predictions. However, participants followed advice significantly more when it 
was expressed confidently. This research suggests that confidence in presenting the advice is 
important, but the advice can contain elements of uncertainty and still be influential.  
People recognize that bad advice can be presented confidently, but people typically 
use the confidence of the advisor as a cue in determining the advice givers’ knowledge, 
correctness, and competence. For example, Price and Stone (2004) found that people who 




express advice confidently, as opposed to in an unsure manner, are perceived as more 
knowledgeable, and this leads to an assumption that the more confident an advisor is, the 
more likely he or she is to be correct in their judgments. This confidence heuristic (i.e., 
assuming that confidence is a cue of knowledge) leads people to be more swayed by 
confidently expressed advice (Price & Stone, 2004).  
Although confidence has mostly been viewed positively, some research suggests that 
this aspect of the advisor could also lead to the formation of negative impressions of the 
advisor. For example, Milyavsky, Kruglanski, Chernikova, and Noa (2017) found that 
negative impressions were formed for people that stated a confident opinion in a rude 
manner. Participants were presented with a medical counseling situation in which a surgeon 
discounted either a mother’s opinion or a chief surgeon’s opinion on incision lines for a liver 
transplant surgery. The manner of which the surgeon dismissed the advice was manipulated 
to be rude, polite, or neutral before participants rated their perceptions of the surgeon. The 
rude dismissal contained a belittling and disparaging statement (e.g., “You don’t know what 
you are talking about, I think that the incision lines are fine.”). Though the surgeon’s 
statement is in fact rude, it also asserts strong confidence in their opinion by disregarding the 
opinion of others in making a decision. Even when the surgeon was considered an expert in 
the situation of dismissing a mother’s opinion, their disparagement and confidence led to 
increased perceptions of arrogance. This suggests that in some circumstances (e.g., 
disparagement plus confidence), confidence can lead to negative perceptions even for those 
with expertise.  
Advisor Likeability 




In addition to the way the advice is presented, the feelings the decision maker has 
toward the advisor can also influence advice taking. Research examining the impact of 
advisor likeability on advice taking shows that people are more likely to follow advice when 
they report liking the advisor more (Bo Feng & MacGeorge, 2010). Specifically, the Bo Feng 
and MacGeorge asked participants to recall a recent conversation where they discussed an 
upsetting problem with someone in their life and this person gave them advice on how to 
respond to the problem. Following this, participants rated how much they liked the advice 
giver and reported whether they intended to follow the advice. The results revealed that 
people followed advice more when they reported a higher liking of the advice giver.  That 
being said, given that this study is strictly correlational, it is possible that factors other than 
the advisor’s likeability produced this effect. For example, people may have liked the advisor 
more when the advice was in their favor. In other words, it is possible that the liking of the 
advice drives the liking of the advisor and levels of advice taking.  
It seems that there are not many studies directly examining the influence of advisor 
likeability on advice taking, but there is related research in persuasion. For example, by 
increasing or decreasing the perceived similarity between the advisor and the judge, 
researchers have been able to induce likeability within the lab. For example, Jiang, Hoegg, 
Dahl, and Chattopadhyay (2010) told participants that the university recreation center was 
promoting a new personal training program and needed student’s feedback. The researchers 
gave participants an information brochure about the program and the trainer. The birthday of 
the trainer was manipulated to either match the participant (similar condition) or to be 
different from the participant. After reading the information about the program and trainer, a 
confederate posing as the trainer came in to explain the program through a ten-minute 




scripted speech. Participants with shared birthdays reported greater feeling of connectedness 
with the trainer, more favorable attitudes toward the program, and were more persuaded by 
the trainer to enroll in the program than those with different birthdays.   
One explanation for these findings is that people often align their opinions, attitudes, 
and decisions with people they perceive as similar and likeable while discounting the 
opinions of dissimilar others (Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004; Gino, 
Shang, & Carson, 2009). Furthering this, Evans (1963) found that real similarities between a 
salesperson and a prospect predicted a greater likelihood for a sale. This held true for 
similarities between age, height, income, religion, education, politics, and smoking habits. It 
is important to note the difference between advice taking and persuasion by homing in on the 
goal of the communicator. Persuasion is the act of a communicator attempting to influence or 
change a person’s attitudes or thoughts (Davidson, 2008) so that they make the decision most 
desired by the communicator, regardless of the accuracy of that decision. When giving 
advice, the communicator, or advisor, is providing information that they believe will lead to a 
more positive, or most accurate, judgment for the person.  
Previous research has also manipulated other factors that induce likeability. For 
example, Reinhard, Messner, and Sporer (2006) had participants watch a home shopping 
commercial starring either an attractive or unattractive actor for an Apple computer. The 
attractive actor was rated as significantly more likeable than the unattractive actor. 
Additionally, participants in the attractive condition reported more positive attitudes toward 
the product and higher intentions to buy the product than those in the unattractive condition.  
Furthering work on perceptions of likeability, Reinhard and Messner (2009) had 
participants view an advertisement for a camera before providing product judgments. 




Likeability was manipulated by having participants read a supposed radio interview with the 
person endorsing the product in the advertisement. The endorser either bragged about his 
new and expensive BMW (unlikeable condition) or talked about a new bicycle (likeable 
condition). Serving as a control condition, some participants were not given an interview 
transcript. Those in the likeable condition and the control condition reporter greater liking of 
the endorser, more positive attitudes toward the camera, and higher intentions to purchase 
than those in the unlikeable condition. These findings each suggest that perceived source 
likeability influences persuasion effectiveness.   
The existing research on advisor likeability and advice taking has been mostly 
correlational. This lack of experimental manipulation makes it difficult to determine if other 
factors may be driving the effect and in turn creating a greater liking of the advisor. The 
current study is, as far as I know, the first combined manipulation of advisor confidence and 
likeability.  
Current Study 
The current study examined the influence of advisor likeability and confidence on 
advice taking. Past work suggests that likeability and expressed confidence influence advice 
taking independently (Bo Feng & MacGeorge, 2010; Gaertig & Simmons, 2018), but what 
might happen if a disliked advisor expressed advice confidently? I experimentally 
manipulated both factors to determine if the influence of confidence on advice taking 
depends on how much one likes the advisor.  
In this study, participants answered a number of trivia questions after being provided 
with advice regarding the questions. To manipulate advisor confidence, advice was either 
expressed confidently or in an unsure manner (e.g., “I’m confident that…” vs. “I’m not really 




sure…”). Liking was manipulated by having the participant read a passage, presumably 
written by the advice-giver that depicted them as either likeable or unlikeable. Following 
previous research findings, my first prediction was that participants would take advice more 
when it was expressed confidently as opposed to when it was expressed in an unsure manner. 
Also stemming from previous research findings, my second prediction was that advice would 
be taken more when it comes from a likeable source as opposed to an unlikeable source. My 
third prediction was that the influence of confidence would depend on whether an advisor is 
liked or not. Specifically, when the advisor was liked, confidently delivered advice would be 
taken more than unsure advice. However, when an advisor was unlikeable, confident advice 
would result in less advice taking as compared to unsure advice. This study’s likeability 
manipulation passage depicts belittling and disparagement, and as previously mentioned, 
confidence combined with disparagement can lead to increased negative perceptions of an 
advisor (Milyavsky et al., 2017). Because of this, my primary prediction was that this 
negative perception would cause greater dislike and lead to less advice taking. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through the Appalachian State University Psychology 
Subject Pool. This pool consists of undergraduate students enrolled in a Psychology course 
who have chosen to participate in research to fulfill an Experiential Learning Credit (ELC) 
for the Psychology course. I had a target sample size of 320 undergraduate students derived 
from a statistical power analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicating an 80% 
chance of detecting an interaction with a small/medium effect size (f = .16, α = .05, β = .20), 
and I was able to recruit 357 participants in total (78.93% women, 19.94% men, and 0.56% 




were transgender). Participants’ average age was 19.5 years. This study was initially 
conducted by having participants come to the research lab to complete the study. However, 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all university classes and studies were transitioned to online 
formats during data collection. Therefore, the study was transitioned to an online study to 
complete data collection. There were 166 participants who completed the study in the lab and 
191 participants who completed the study online.  
Appalachian State University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined this 
study to be exempt from IRB oversight (see Appendix A).  
Design 
The research methodology employed a 2 (advisor likeability: likeable vs. unlikeable) 
x 2 (advisor confidence: confident vs. unsure) between-subjects design.  
Procedure 
Participants read through an informed consent document (see Appendix B) that 
indicated the study would take no longer than 30 minutes and would satisfy 1 ELC. 
Following this, instructions were presented stating that they were participating in a study 
examining how people use information coming from another person. The instructions then 
informed participants that, in a previous part of the study, people were asked to provide 
advice regarding a number of trivia questions. Although the information about a previous part 
of the study was fabricated, it served as a cover story to allow for the advisor likeability 
manipulation. Participants were told that they were randomly paired with one of the previous 
participants. In this thesis, this partner will be referred to as the “advisor”.  
The next section of the study randomly assigned participants to either the likeable 
advisor condition or the unlikeable advisor condition. Likeability was manipulated by having 




the participants read a passage they believe their advisor wrote. There were two passages that 
were pretested to depict the advisor as either likeable or unlikeable (see Appendix C). 
Participants were told that in the previous part of the study, advisors were asked to write 
about something that happened in the past two weeks that they were proud of. Participants 
were instructed to use this passage to learn a bit more about their advisor. 
The instructions then told participants that they would be asked to provide an initial 
answer to the trivia question, receive advice from the advisor, and then provide a final 
estimate to the same trivia question. The trivia questions (see Appendix D for complete list of 
questions and answers) were derived from studies by Kausel, Culbertson, Leiva, Slaughter, 
and Jackson (2015). Importantly, to help ensure that participants understood the advice was 
coming from the same person responsible for writing the passage, a random set of initials 
was assigned to the advisor. For example, if participants were told that they have been paired 
with Advisor H.O., the following advice statements all began with “Advisor H.O.:…”.  
Participants were then randomly assigned to either the confident advisor condition or 
the unsure advisor condition. Those in the confident advisor condition read advice framed 
confidently (e.g., “I’m virtually certain that the African elephants can live to 80 years old, so 
you should put that.”); whereas, advice for those in the unsure advisor condition was 
presented in an unsure manner (e.g., “I’m really not certain, but you should maybe go with 
80 years old.”; see Appendix E for complete list of advice). Participants were then asked to 
provide a final estimate to the same trivia question, and this process (initial estimate, receive 
advice, final estimate) was completed for each of the three trivia questions. 
Once an initial and final estimate was provided for each trivia question, participants 
provided a self-report of how knowledgeable, confident, trustworthy, likeable, helpful, and 




similar their advisor seemed on a 7-point scale (see Appendix F for complete list of 
questions). Lastly, participants answered demographic questions (e.g., age and gender), 
received debriefing and credit (1 ELC) for participation.  
Pilot Studies 
I conducted two pilot studies to ensure that the manipulations of advisor confidence 
and likeability would be effective. In the first pilot study, 160 Appalachian State University 
undergraduates participated in an advice taking study. Half of the participants received 
confidently expressed advice and half received unsure advice (see Appendix E). Later, the 
participants were asked to indicate how confident the advisor seemed on a 1 (not at all 
confident) to 7 (extremely confident) response scale. As expected, participants who received 
confident advice (M = 5.03, SD = 1.52) rated the advisors’ confidence significantly higher 
than those in the unsure condition (M = 2.47, SD = 1.36), t(158)= -11.22, p < .001, d = 1.77.  
In the second pilot study, students in a social psychology lab course at Appalachian 
State University recruited 149 friends and family members to participate in an advice taking 
study.  The participants read a passage presumably written by the advisor (see Appendix C) 
that presented the advisor in a likeable or unlikeable way. Participants later indicated how 
much they liked the advisor on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) response scale. Participants in 
the likeable condition (M = 4.85, SD = 1.46) rated the advisors’ likeability significantly 
higher than those in the unlikeable condition (M = 3.74, SD = 1.64), t(147)= -4.37, p < .001, 
d = 0.72. In short, both pilot studies suggest that the manipulations of confidence and 
likeability would be effective.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 





In order to examine the effectiveness of the confidence manipulation in the current 
study, I conducted a 2 (advisor likeability: likeable vs. unlikeable) x 2 (advisor confidence: 
confident vs. unsure) ANOVA on perceived advisor confidence ratings (see Figure 1). As 
expected, participants who received confident advice (M = 5.48, SD = 1.63) rated the 
advisors’ confidence significantly higher than those in the unsure condition (M = 2.39, SD = 
1.43), F(1, 353) = 366.36, p < .001, ɳp2 = .509. There was not a significant main effect of 
likeability, F(1, 353) = 0.65, p = .419, ɳp2 = .002, indicating that likeability conditions did not 
influence advisor confidence ratings. There was no significant interaction between 
confidence condition and likeability conditions, F(1, 353) = 0.90, p =.343, ɳp2 = .003. 
To examine the effectiveness of the likeability manipulation, I conducted a 2 (advisor 
likeability: likeable vs. unlikeable) x 2 (advisor confidence: confident vs. unsure) ANOVA on 
perceived advisor likeability ratings (see Figure 2). As expected, participants in the likeable 
condition (M = 3.99, SD = 1.26) rated the advisors’ likeability significantly higher than those 
in the unlikeable condition (M = 3.44, SD = 1.35), F(1, 353) = 18.03, p < .001, ɳp2 = .049. 
This analysis also revealed a significant interaction between confidence condition and 
likeability condition on perceived likeability scores, F(1, 353) = 9.59, p = .002, ɳp2 = .026. 
There was a larger difference in perceived likeability between the likeable and unlikeable 
advisor in the confident condition relative to the unsure condition. There was not a significant 
main effect of confidence, F(1, 353) = 0.02, p = .889, ɳp2 = .000, indicating that confidence 
did not influence advisor likeability ratings. 
To ensure that the confidence and likeability manipulations were effective for the 
online and in-lab participants, I first conducted a 2 (advisor confidence: confident vs. unsure) 




x 2 (sample: online vs. in-lab) ANOVA on participants’ ratings of the advisor’s confidence. 
There was not a significant advisor confidence x sample interact, F(1, 353) = 0.84, p = .359, 
ɳp2 = .002, indicating that the influence of the confidence manipulation was similarly 
effective for both samples. Next, I conducted a 2 (advisor likeability: likeable vs. unlikeable) 
x 2 (sample: online vs. in-lab) ANOVA on participants’ ratings of the advisor’s likeability. 
There was not a significant advisor likeability x sample interaction, F(1, 353) = 0.08, p 
= .773, ɳp2 = .000, again suggesting the likeability manipulation was similarly effective for 
both samples. 
Test of Hypotheses 
To test my hypotheses, I first calculated participants’ weight of advice (WOA) scores 
using the formula: WOA= |initial estimate – final estimate| / |initial estimate – advice value|. 
This measure has been used in a number of previous studies on advice taking (e.g., Gino & 
Moore, 2007; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004). If a participant ignored the advice 
completely and gave the exact same initial and final estimate, this participant would have a 
WOA score of 0; however, if a participant fully took advice (i.e., their final estimate was 
equal to the advice), this participant’s WOA score would be 1. That is, higher WOA values 
indicate greater advice taking. In line with the previous research using WOA, if a 
participants’ final estimate did not fall between the advice value and initial estimate 
(producing a WOA > 1), their estimate was dropped from analysis. Additionally, if the initial 
value reported was the same as the advice value presented, the equation produces an error 
(the denominator is 0) so the estimate was dropped. I calculated the WOA for each question, 
and then averaged across each question to get an average WOA score for each participant. 
Overall, 20 WOA scores (1.86% of the 1074 calculated for all participants) were excluded 




because they were greater than 1 and 40 WOA scores (3.72%) were dropped because a 
participant’s estimate was the same as the advice. However, no participant had all three WOA 
scores excluded, so all participants were included in the analyses. 
Next, I conducted a 2 (advisor likeability: likeable vs. unlikeable) x 2 (advisor 
confidence: confident vs. unsure) factorial ANOVA on participants’ average WOA (see 
Figure 3). There was a significant main effect of confidence on advice taking, F(1, 353) = 
12.81, p < .001, ɳp2 = .035. Participants took advice significantly more when it was expressed 
in a confident manner as opposed to an unsure manner. There was not a significant main 
effect of likeability on advice taking, F(1, 353) = .16, p = .693, ɳp2 = .000. The advisor’s 
likeability did not influence levels of advice taking. To test the third hypothesis that confident 
advice from an unlikeable advisor would lead to less advice taking, I examined the 
interaction between confidence and likeability and found that it was not significant, F(1, 353) 
= .01, p = .932, ɳp2 = .000. My third hypothesis was not supported, suggesting that the 
influence of advisor confidence on advice taking does not depend on whether or not one likes 
the advisor.  
Exploratory Analysis 
At the end of the study, each participant provided a self-report of how knowledgeable, 
confident, trustworthy, likeable, helpful, and similar their advisor seemed on a 7-point scale 
(see Appendix F for complete list of questions). Exploratory analyses examined correlations 
between participants’ perceptions of the advisor and WOA values. Some noteworthy 
relationships are described below, but see Table 1 for the complete correlation matrix. 
Significantly positive correlations were found between WOA scores and each of the six 
advisor characteristics. In other words, participants were more likely to take their advisor’s 




advice when they rated the advisor as more knowledgeable, confident, trustworthy, likeable, 
helpful, and similar to themselves.  
Perhaps most interesting is the relationship between perceived likeability and WOA 
scores. Participants took advice more when they reported greater liking of the advisor, r(355) 
= .25, p < .001. This finding seems to contradict the finding that the likeability manipulation 
successfully influenced how much people reported liking the advisor, but people did not take 
the advice from the likeable advisor more than the unlikeable advisor.  
Lastly, I examined whether the influence of the confidence condition and the lack of 
an influence of the likeability condition on participants’ WOA scores varied across the two 
samples. Specifically, I conducted a 2 (confidence) x 2 (likeability) x 2 (sample: in-lab vs. 
online) ANOVA on participants average WOA score. As before, there was a significant main 
effect of confidence on WOA scores, F(1, 353) = 12.37, p < .001, ɳp2 = .034, no main effect 
of likeability, F(1, 353) = .18, p = .674, ɳp2 = .001, and no significant interaction between 
confidence and likeability, F(1, 353) = .03, p = .873, ɳp2 = .000. There was no main effect of 
sample on WOA scores, F(1, 353) = .68, p = .409, ɳp2 = .002, indicating that average WOA 
scores did not significantly differ between the in-lab sample and the online sample. There 
was not a significant interaction between confidence and sample on average WOA scores, 
F(1, 353) = 1.00, p = .318, ɳp2 = .003. Interestingly, there was a significant interaction 
between liking condition and study type, F(1, 353) = 5.00, p = .026, ɳp2 = .014. Participants 
who completed the study in the lab took advice more from a likeable advisor than an 
unlikeable advisor, whereas the participants who completed the study online took the advice 
from the unlikeable advisor slightly more than the likeable advisor (see Figure 4). Lastly, 
there was not a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 353) = 1.98, p = .160, ɳp2 = .006. 





This study investigated the influence of advisor likeability and confidence on advice 
taking. The first prediction that confident advice would lead to greater advice taking was 
supported. Participants in the confident condition took their advisor’s advice more than those 
in the unsure condition. The second hypothesis, by contrast, was not supported. Participants 
did not take advice more from a likeable advisor than an unlikeable advisor. The novel 
hypothesis of this thesis—that confident advice from an unlikeable advisor would lead to less 
advice taking than unsure advice from an unlikeable advisor—was also not supported. From 
this study alone, it seems that confident advice leads to greater advice taking, and this 
influence does not necessarily depend on how much one likes the advisor.  
How Advisor Confidence Influenced Advice Taking 
As noted earlier, there are many studies that have examined the influence of advisor 
confidence on advice taking (e.g., Bang et al., 2004; Gaertig & Simmons, 2018; Price & 
Stone, 2004; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). These studies have consistently found that people 
are more likely to follow advice when it is expressed confidently as opposed to an unsure 
manner. The current study replicated these findings and provides additional support to the 
literature examining confidence and advice taking. These findings are also in line with the 
idea of a confidence heuristic (Price & Stone, 2004). That is, the advisor’s confidence may 
have served as a cue for the advisor’s knowledge, competence, and correctness and in turn 
led to greater advice taking. In support of this explanation, participants in the confident 
condition, compared to those in the unsure condition, rated the advisor as more 
knowledgeable, trustworthy, and helpful.  




The way in which advice was presented in this study also serves as an advancement 
in the advice taking literature. The vast majority of advice taking research has utilized advice 
that is more of a stated opinion than an explicit piece of advice. For example, in the studies 
conducted by Gaertig and Simmons (2018), the advisors simply stated their opinions (e.g., 
“I’m confident the Chicago Bulls will win”). Stating an opinion does not necessarily 
constitute as advice. In the current study, the advisor gave explicit advice (e.g., “I’m virtually 
certain that the African elephant can live to 80 years old, so you should put that.”). The fact 
that the findings of the current study were similar to previous research strengthens the claim 
that confident advice leads to greater advice taking. 
The  (Lack of an) Impact of Advisor Likeability on Advice Taking 
Participants were just as likely to take advice from the unlikeable advisor as they 
were from the likeable advisor. This finding is in contrast to what other research has 
previously found. For example, as noted earlier, Bo Feng and MacGeorge (2010) found that 
people were more likely to take advice from advisors they liked relative to advisors they did 
not like. The lack of an effect of likeability in the current study does not appear to be due to 
failure of the likability manipulation given that participants who read the passage from the 
likeable advisor did rate that individual higher on likeability than the unlikeable advisor. 
Although participants in the likeable condition did not take advice more than those in the 
unlikeable condition, participants took advice more from advisors if they found them to be 
more likable. Of course, this relationship is strictly correlational. Therefore, it is possible that 
the relationship between advice taking and perceived likeability was driven by a third 
variable. Or, as previously noted, it is possible that this study’s likeability manipulation—
although successful—was not strong enough to influence levels of advice taking.  




Serving as another advancement in the literature, it is worth noting that I 
experimentally manipulated likeability while the aforementioned previous research on advice 
taking and likeability has been correlational (Bo Feng & MacGeorge, 2010). Bo Feng and 
MacGeorge had participants recall a recent conversation where they discussed an upsetting 
problem with someone and this person gave them advice on how to react to the situation. The 
participants were then asked to rate how much they liked the advisor and whether or not they 
intended to follow the advice. Participants were more likely to follow the advice when they 
reported greater liking of the advisor. Due to the recollection aspect of the study, it is possible 
that recollection or memory biases influenced the findings. Because I did not find an effect of 
likeability on advice taking, it is possible that findings from correlational designs are not as 
strong as they might seem to be. 
Does the Influence of Advisor Confidence Depend on Likeability 
As previously noted, it is possible that confidence from an unlikeable advisor could 
be viewed negatively and result in less advice taking (Milyavsky et al., 2017); however, in 
the current study, confident advice was taken more than unsure advice, regardless of 
likeability. It seems as though the influence of advisor confidence on advice taking does not 
depend on likeability. In other words, when advice is expressed confidently, people are more 
likely to take the advice, regardless of the advisor’s perceived likeability.  
Other Factors Associated with Advice Taking  
As previously noted, due to COVID-19, all university classes and studies were 
transitioned to online formats during data collection. Therefore, serving as an exploratory 
analysis, I examined potential differences between the in-lab and online version of this study. 
The confidence manipulation had a similar impact on advice taking for both the online and 




in-lab participants. While the liking manipulation was equally successful for both the in-lab 
and online study, participants in the online study took advice more from the unlikeable 
advisor while participants in the in-lab study took advice more from the likeable advisor. One 
possibility for this finding could be that participants were more focused and paid greater 
attention to the passage that served as the liking manipulation. Those who participated online 
may not have read the passage as carefully and/or viewed it as an important aspect of the 
study and were therefore less impacted by it. Although possible, this seems unlikely because 
the liking manipulation produced a similar effect on the perceived likeability judgments for 
both the online and in-lab version of the study.  
Lastly, another interesting exploratory finding was that the likeability manipulation 
was stronger for those in the high confidence condition compared to the low confidence 
condition. In other words, participants’ in the high confidence condition reported stronger 
dislike of the unlikeable advisor and greater liking of the likeable advisor. This finding may 
support the “confident bastards” idea; confidence seems to be valuable from a likeable source 
but potentially aggravating when coming from an unlikeable source. That being said, this 
pattern was only found when examining participants’ liking of the advisor and not how much 
they took the advisor’s advice. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
As with all research, this study is not without limitations. First, although I provided a 
backstory for the likeability manipulation passage, the study as a whole was artificial in 
nature. That is, participants were asked to answer trivia questions while also receiving advice 
on a computer from a “previous participant”. Furthermore, given the sample and trivia 
questions I utilized, this scenario was not an important domain for the participants. While the 




findings certainly have implications for real-life situations in which one may receive advice 
(e.g., working in a group project, making financial decisions, collaborating on research, etc.), 
the scenario used was not particularly important to participants. Additionally, the participants 
were not given explicit incentives to provide good estimates.  
Future research could, depending on the samples, gear a study using a domain that is 
personally important to the participants. For example, another study with a sample of 
undergraduate students could benefit from giving participants incentives (e.g., money, extra 
credit points) for accurate judgments. This would presumably increase participants’ 
motivation to make good judgments and would allow for their judgments to have 
consequences.  
Lastly, given that perceived advisor likeability was positively correlated with advice 
taking, it is possible that the likeability manipulation may have not been strong enough to 
impact levels of advice taking. The likeability manipulation, although significant, only 
shifted participants’ average likeability ratings of the advisor from 3.43 in the unlikeable 
condition to 3.99 in the likeable condition. There were, however, several participants—
regardless of the likeability condition—who rated the advisor as extremely likeable or 
extremely unlikeable. Therefore, it is possible that the correlation between likeability and 
advice taking was significant because people’s likeability ratings spanned the entire range of 
the response scale.  However, the likeability manipulation failed to influence advice taking 
because the manipulation only influenced the average likeability ratings by approximately .6 
points on the 1-7 point response scale.  
This study’s experimental manipulation of advisor likeability could, in the future, 
allow for improved examinations to determine if larger differences in likeability can 




influence levels of advice taking. Such manipulations also create greater sureness that 
likeability is what drives an increase or decrease in advice taking rather than other related 
factors. Future studies with stronger manipulations would produce greater dislike in the 
advisor and could therefore increase the likelihood of finding that the influence of advisor 
confidence on advice taking might depend on just how much one likes the advisor. For 
example, a future study could first have participants complete an unrelated task with a trained 
confederate. The confederate could act really nice and helpful towards participants in the 
likeable condition while acting outwardly rude and disparaging towards participants in the 
unlikeable condition. Following this interaction, the confederate would provide either 
confident or unsure advice to the participant. That is, if greater dislike is produced in the 
future, it would be easier to determine whether or not confidence could backfire when 
combined with dislike, cause an advisor to be viewed as a confident bastard, and therefore 
lead to less advice taking. It is also possible that the likeability manipulation may have 
influenced how much participants related to the advisor. Participants of this study were 
undergraduate students that likely experience frustrations with parents similar to those 
expressed in the unlikeable advisor passage. If this were the case, it is possible that even 
those in the unlikeable condition may have related to their advisor and this relatability 
influenced levels of advice taking. This could then explain the positive correlation between 
advice taking and advisor likeability, as well as the failure of likeability conditions to 
produce a significant effect on advice taking. 
Conclusion 
The findings of this thesis expanded the current advice taking literature by replicating 
previous findings, utilizing explicit advice statements, and experimentally manipulating 




advisor likeability, but the purpose of this study was to examine a potential situation in which 
confidence could hinder advice taking. Specifically, this research was the first to 
experimentally manipulate advisor confidence and likeability and found that the influence of 
confidence on advice taking does not depend on how much one likes the advisor. In other 
words, it seems that it is always better to express advice confidently, even when the advisor is 
disliked. People may dislike confident bastards, but they are still more likely to take their 
advice over the advice from an unsure bastard.  
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Note: * p < .001; WOA index coded on a 0 – 1 scale; Knowledgeable, Confident, 
Trustworthy, Likeable, Helpful, and Similar Indexes coded on a 0 – 7 Likert scale. All values 
are r-values.  
  
 Mean (SD) Knowledgeable Confident Trustworthy Likeable Helpful Similar 
WOA 0.48 (0.32) .469* .256* .487* .245* .555* .252* 
Knowledgeable 3.49 (1.52) - .477* .640* .434* .692* .272* 
Confident 3.84 (2.17)  - .348* .093 .443* .044 
Trustworthy 3.12 (1.38)   - .495* .669* .370* 
Likeable 3.71 (1.33)    - .464* .514* 
Helpful 3.31 (1.60)     - .377* 
Similar 3.13 (1.34)      - 





Figure 1. Participants’ ratings of their advisors’ confidence on a 7-point scale split by 
































Figure 2. Participants’ ratings of their advisors’ likeability on a 7-point scale split by 



















































Figure 4. Participants’ average WOA scores for the in-lab and online samples, split by 
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Likeable Condition Passage 
"My dad is fairly unhealthy and is trying to lose weight. I've been helping him pick out meals 
to make and checking in to see how his diet is going. When he visited last week, I made sure 
I didn't have any junk food at my house. He has been making progress and seems a lot 
happier now. Even though I can't be around him all the time, I'm really proud that I've been 
able to help him with his diet and stick to his goal. I wish I could help him out more, but he 
says what I am doing is really helping a lot. I'm really excited to see how much weight he'll 
be able to lose and I hope he sticks with the diet. Yeah, helping my dad with his diet is what 
I'm proud of." 
 
Unlikeable Condition Passage 
"My dad is fairly unhealthy and is trying to lose weight. Every time he visits, he always 
complains about the junk food that I have in my house, even though I'm not fat like he is. I 
have to bite my tongue so we don't get into a fight. We can't even go to some of my favorite 
restaurants because he says they aren't healthy enough. He seems to be losing weight, but he 
has been pretty annoying about it. I guess I'm proud that I haven't gotten into more arguments 
with him about it. I could complain all the time about how he is being. We've gotten into a 
couple fights, but I could only keep my mouth shut for so long. Yeah, not telling my dad how 









Trivia Questions  
What is the average lifespan for an African elephant in the wild? (56 years)  
How many keys are there on a standard modern piano? (88 keys) 










Confident Condition Advice  
I’m virtually certain that the African elephants can live to 80 years old, so you should put 
that. 
I am confident there are 120 keys on a piano, so you should definitely go with that guess. 
I’m almost positive that there are 70 stories, so I would guess that if I were you. 
 
Unsure Condition Advice 
I’m really not certain, but you should maybe go with 80 years old. 
I could be wrong, but I would guess 120 keys if I were you. 









Perception of Advisor Questions 
How knowledgeable did the advice giver seem to you based on their advice? 
1 (Not at all knowledgeable) – 7 (Extremely knowledgeable) 
How confident did the advice giver seem in their advice? 
1 (Not at all confident) – 7 (Extremely confident) 
How much do you trust the advice giver? 
1 (Do not trust at all) – 7 (Great deal of trust) 
How much do you think you would like the advice giver? 
1 (Would not like at all) – 7 (Would like a lot) 
How helpful was the advice you received from the advice giver? 
1 (Not at all helpful) – 7 (Extremely helpful) 
How similar do you think you are to the advice giver? 
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